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Judge and Banker-Valuation Analyses in
the Delaware Courts
William A. Groll and David Leinwand'
I. INTRODUCTION
Litigation challenging public company merger and acquisition
transactions is on the increase. Whereas, not too long ago, only
transactions involving director conflicts of interest or other potentially
troubling facts would bring forth the plaintiffs' lawyers, today, lawsuits
can be expected challenging even those transactions in which a board of
directors has, by all readily apparent views, pursued a reasonable process
in fulfillment of its fiduciary duties, gamering a significant premium for
its shareholders.2 In such merger and acquisition litigation, the financial
advisor to the board of directors often finds itself in the center of the
lawyers' fray with its valuation analyses a crucial factor in the case.
Senior bankers are in depositions and before judges more often than in
1. The authors are partners at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP in New York.
2. See Matt Egan, M&A Lawsuits Skyrocket as Fee-Hungry Law Firms Smell Easy
Money, Fox BusINESS (July 12, 2011), http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2011/07/11/
ma-lawsuits-skyrocket-as-fee-hungry-law-firms-smell-easy-money/#ixzzlRzbBVXBE.
There is substantial incentive for plaintiffs' firms to bring litigation relating to mergers
and acquisition transactions as the typical award of attorneys' fees ranges from $400,000
to $500,000. See Gina Chon, Delaware Chancery Court Judges Making Lawyers Earn
It, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304567
604576454461091005264.html. Substantial fees often are awarded even in cases in
which plaintiffs do not receive any monetary damages or the transaction is not enjoined
so long as there are modifications to the disclosure documents filed with U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission in connection with the transaction or to non-financial deal
terms. Recently, however, Delaware courts have taken a more critical look at
applications for legal fees, and it remains to be seen whether this will lead to a decrease
in questionable mergers and acquisitions related litigation.
3. Since the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), which held that the directors' failure to be adequately informed
regarding a corporation's value in connection with a sale of control constituted a breach
of their duty of care, it has become accepted practice for a board of directors agreeing to a
sale of control to obtain a fairness opinion from an investment bank. See Steven M.
Davidoff, Fairness Opinions, 55 AM. U. L. REv. 1557, 1559-1560 (2006). However, as
the Delaware courts have recognized, it is the underlying valuation work, as opposed to
the opinion itself, that has the "real informative value." In re Pure Resources, Inc.,
S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 449 (Del. Ch. 2002).
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the past, and now, more than ever, financial advisors should expect their
analyses to be subject to close scrutiny in the course of deal litigation.4
Recent cases decided in the state courts of Delaware, where most
merger and acquisition litigation historically has been brought, provide
useful guidance for lawyers who counsel financial advisors as well as
those who advise principals to transactions regarding how to mitigate
litigation risk arising out of a financial advisor's opinion and analyses.
The cases helpful to practitioners can be divided roughly into two
groups-appraisal/entire fairness cases and disclosure cases.
The appraisal and entire fairness cases provide guidance regarding
the substance and application of valuation analyses. In a typical
appraisal action, for instance, the court must determine the "fair value"
of the shares at issue,5 and such determination usually is based on a
review of competing valuation analyses submitted by the parties.
Similarly, the entire fairness standard, which is applied to certain conflict
of interest transactions, requires the court to determine whether an
"entirely fair price" was paid to shareholders.6 In the course of such
determination, the court often will closely scrutinize the valuation work
performed by the financial advisor for the subject company's board of
directors.
In the relevant disclosure cases, plaintiffs challenge the description
of the financial advisor's analyses set forth in the shareholder disclosure
document relating to the transaction, such as a proxy statement soliciting
shareholder votes. In such cases, the court will focus primarily on the
4. Investment banks are well advised to ensure that a senior banker who has been
involved directly in the subject transaction is available as a witness if the bank's financial
analyses are scrutinized in litigation. As Vice Chancellor Laster remonstrated on one
recent occasion,
[W]e, as a Court, have long expected people to make their bankers available
and to facilitate document production from their bankers. It would not allow
these cases to be adjudicated responsibly if managing directors could decide
that they are simply too busy to play a role in terms of the actual adjudication
of the deals for which their investment banks are making seven-figure fees, and
that they instead have better things to do, and therefore, they will send one of
their junior members instead to answer non-responsively the questions that are
put to them in deposition. ...
Transcript of Ruling of the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 18-
19, Steinhardt v. Howard-Anderson, No. 5878-VCL (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2011).
5. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2010).
6. For instance, the entire fairness standard is usually applied in cases where a
controlling shareholder seeks to squeeze out minority shareholders or the board of
directors is otherwise deemed conflicted in the relevant transaction. Such cases typically
raise the issue of whether the board of directors adequately represented the interests of
the minority shareholders, and it must be demonstrated that both the process that led to
the transaction and the consideration paid in the transaction were entirely fair to the
minority. See, e.g., Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422 (Del. 1997); In re CNX Gas
Corp. S'holders Litig., 4 A.3d 397 (Del. Ch. 2010).
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adequacy of the disclosure regarding the bank's work as opposed to its
methodology and judgments. The disclosure cases thus shed light on
how to describe the bank's work in the disclosure document and, perhaps
more importantly, how to prepare for such disclosure as the analyses are
conducted.
Below are some of the lessons for practitioners that can be gleaned
from the recent Delaware cases.
II. NUMBERS DON'T LIE: ENTIRE FAIRNESS AND APPRAISAL CASES
A. There Is Some Measure of Safety to Be Found in Consistency and,
to the Extent Practical, an Investment Bank Should Consider
Adopting a Standard Approach to Valuation Analyses to Be
Applied, or at Least Considered, in the Ccourse of all of its
Financial Advisory Assignments.
The plaintiffs' bar and the Delaware courts have become quite
sophisticated in reviewing valuation analyses and are thoroughly
conversant in the related, highly technical financial arcana. As a result, a
financial advisor should be prepared, among other things, for questions
relating to any differences in its valuation methods as compared to those
used in other similar transactions. This argues in favor of adopting
standardized approaches to analyses coupled with vigorous institutional
oversight from a fairness committee or some other institutional
reviewing body.7 Of course, there are times when changes in approach
are appropriate to reflect economic or industry conditions or facts about
the particular company or transaction, but in such cases the banker
should be prepared to explain in a deposition or before a court why the
circumstances required a different approach from that previously applied.
Presumably, such an explanation will be less of an ordeal for the banker
if he or she has first explained the changes to an internal reviewing body.
In Global GT v. Golden Telecom, then Vice Chancellor Strine
stressed the importance of consistency and the ability to justify changes
to valuation methods used in previous transactions. There, the
7. FINRA Rule 5150 requires disclosure in a financial advisor's fairness opinion
(which is then further disclosed in the relevant document sent to shareholders) whether
the fairness opinion was approved or issued by a member firm's fairness committee.
FINRA, Securities Offering and Trading Standards and Practices 5150, Fairness
Opinions, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display-main.html?rbid=
2403&elementid=6832 (last visited Dec. 9, 2011). In addition to reviewing the
substance of the analyses, such a fairness committee may also be the appropriate
institutional body to consider whether the analyses are consistent with firm standards, and
if not, why departures from the standards are justified. Other institutional mechanisms
could also be put in place to perform such function as the use of a distinct reviewing
committee or review by individuals who are expert in the firm's valuation standards.
9592012]1
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petitioners, shareholders in a Russian-based, NASDAQ-listed
telecommunications company, claimed that the company was
undervalued in a merger transaction and sought appraisal. The court
noted that, "[a]s is typical, the outcome of this appraisal proceeding
largely depends on [the court's] acceptance, rejection, or modification of
the views of the parties' valuation experts."8
In finding for the petitioners and awarding a value per share
significantly higher than the deal price, the court focused on a change by
the defendants' valuation expert in the approach to the beta9 used in
discounted cash flow (DCF) analyses across cases. The Vice Chancellor
remarked:
[The expert] testified in this case that his opinion in Travelocity [an
older case before V.C. Strine in which the same expert had provided
valuation analyses] was in line with what he taught and understood
about beta at that time and, since 2006, he has switched. . . . But,
oddly, he cannot point to an epiphanic moment or any academic or
other studies that prompted him to change his approach.10
While an epiphany or reams of academic support are not always
necessary, bankers should be in a position to articulate sound reasons for
differences with previous analyses when the judge, or more likely, a
plaintiffs attorney, begins to ask questions. If a bank has a standardized
approach, inadvertent changes are less likely to occur, and if any
particular analysis does not conform to the bank's standard, the banker
presumably will be required to explain his or her reasoning to an
institutional reviewing body before the analysis goes out the door.
B. Valuation Analyses Should Reflect Well-Accepted Methods and the
Latest Industry Developments as Applicable, and the Banker Should
Be in a Position to Explain the Nuances of the Analyses to
Plaintifs' Counsel and the Court.
In recent appraisal and entire fairness cases, the Chancery Court has
vigorously tested analyses against industry practice and the latest
developments in the field. For instance, in Golden Telecom, the Vice
Chancellor carefully examined the parties' treatment of inflation and
industry trends and the underlying data they relied on with respect to the
determination of terminal growth rates used in the discounted cash flow
analyses. 1 He reviewed the tax rates applied to free cash flows by the
8. Global GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc., 993 A.2d 497, 498 (Del. Ch. 2010).
9. Beta is a measure of the volatility of the company's share price-measuring the
extent to which the share price changes relative to changes in the market as a whole.
10. Golden Telecom, 993 A.2d at 521.
11. Id. at 511-13.
960 [Vol. 116:3
JUDGE AND BANKER
parties and the assumptions behind them, including management's view
and the company's historical rate.12 The Vice Chancellor painstakingly
scrutinized whether an historical equity risk premium found in the 2008
Ibbotsen Yearbook or supply side equity risk premium from the 2007
lbbotsen Yearbook was appropriate, ultimately choosing the supply side
equity risk premium.13 He also provided an analysis of whether the
appropriate source for the subject company's beta was MSCI Barra or
the Bloomberg historic raw beta (in the end, he came up with his own
blended beta following a lengthy discourse on the company and
industry).14
The Vice Chancellor's actual determinations were less important
than his method. He held the analyses up to "the weight of academic
thinking at our nation's finest finance departments" as well as recent
industry practice to determine the appropriate approach." As Golden
Telecom illustrates, banks that may find their valuation analyses before a
Delaware court would be well-served to establish procedures to ensure
both that their methods reflect the latest accepted thinking in the field
and that bankers are in a position to explain the nuances of those
methods and how and why they were applied. As a result of this trend in
the Delaware courts, some of the leading investment banks now routinely
consult with academicians in finance regarding recent developments and
best practices and have these experts conduct regular continuing
education sessions for the bankers that conduct these sorts of analyses.
C. Look Beyond the Market Price, But Tread Carefully ifDoing So
May Be Construed as Ccontrary to the Shareholders'Interest.
It has long been accepted under Delaware law that a stock market
trading price is not the only measure of a corporation's value and that a
complete and informed study of value typically requires application of
financial valuation analyses. As a result, when advising boards of
directors regarding the value of a corporation, investment banks rely not
only on market price but also on other measures such as analyses of the
present value of projected cash flows (typically referred to as a
discounted cash flow analysis), prices and premia paid in similar
transactions, the contribution each entity is expected to make to the pro
forma combined entity with respect to certain financial metrics, the
12. Id. at 513-14.
13. Id. at 514-18.
14. Id. at 518-24.
15. Id. at 518.
16. See Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989);
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712-13 (Del. 1983).
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prices at which comparable companies trade, and the value of the
corporation's distinct lines of business when considered separately,
either in comparison with the value of comparable companies or the
prices or premia paid in transactions involving companies in similar lines
of business-so-called "sum of the parts" analyses. 17 In fact, in most
cases, it likely would constitute a breach of a board of directors'
fiduciary duties if the board did not consider some valuation analyses
other than market price in the course of a sale of control.18
Chancellor Strine's recent decision in In re Southern Peru Copper
Corp. S'holder Derivative Litig.,19 however, counsels caution in slighting
market price in favor of other metrics if doing so is not clearly in the
shareholders' interest. Because the Southern Peru case provides several
significant lessons for practitioners, it is worth reviewing its facts in
some detail. Grupo Mexico, the controlling stockholder of Southern
Peru Copper Corporation with a 54.17% economic interest and 63.08%
of the vote, proposed that Southern Peru buy Grupo Mexico's financially
troubled subsidiary, Minera Mexico. 20 Grupo Mexico initially proposed
that Southern Peru purchase Minera for 72.3 million newly-issued shares
of Southern Peru stock.2 1 At the time of the proposal, the aggregate
value of those shares was $3.05 billion based on the trading price of
Southern Peru shares on the New York Stock Exchange.22 By contrast,
Minera was a privately owned company (Grupo Mexico owned over
99% of the equity), and thus there was no market-based measure of its
value.23 Because both Southern Peru and Minera were controlled by
Grupo Mexico, the Southern Peru board formed a special committee to
evaluate the proposed transaction and hired independent counsel and an
independent financial advisor. 24
Following its initial due diligence, the financial advisor to the
Southern Peru special committee generated preliminary valuation
analyses for Minera including a discounted cash flow analysis, a
contribution analysis, and a sum-of-the-parts analysis.2 5 Two sets of
projections were used in the preliminary valuation analyses: one set
17. See Davidoff, supra note 3, at 1574-76 (discussing different types of analyses
relied on by investment banks in connection with rendering fairness opinions).
18. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (finding that failure to
obtain financial analyses of the corporation's value contributed to the directors' breach of
their fiduciary duty of care in connection with a sale of control of the corporation).
19. In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S'holder Derivative Litig., 30 A.3d 60 (Del. Ch.
2011).




24. Id. at 97.
25. Id. at 101-02.
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prepared by Minera management, and a second set prepared by the
special committee's independent mining consultant that adjusted the
Minera management projections downward. Only when using the low
end of its range of assumed discount rates, the highest assumption
regarding long-term commodity prices, and the unadjusted Minera
management projections did the financial advisor get to a $3 billion
value for Minera on a discounted cash flow basis.26 Applying the same
assumptions to the adjusted projections yielded a discounted cash flow
value of $2.41 billion.27 Using the discount rate and commodity price at
the middle of the assumed ranges and the adjusted projections resulted in
a $1.7 billion equity value for Minera.28 Contribution analyses implied
an equity value range for Minera of $1.1 to $1.7 billion, and the sum-of-
the-parts analyses implied an equity value range for Minera of $227
million to $1.3 billion.2 9
In this preliminary presentation to the special committee, the
financial advisor compared the results of its analyses of Minera to an
equity value for Southern Peru of $3.1 billion based solely on the trading
price of Southern Peru shares on the New York Stock Exchange.30 The
court focused on this fact, noting:
The important assumption reflected in [the preliminary] presentation
that a bloc of shares of Southern Peru could yield a cash value equal
to Southern Peru's actual stock market price and thus worth its
market value is worth pausing over. At trial, the defendants
disclaimed any reliance upon a claim that Southern Peru's stock
market price was not a reliable indication of the cash value that a
very large bloc of shares-such as the 67.2 million paid to Grupo
Mexico-could yield in the market. 31
It is not clear from the opinion, however, whether reliance on market
price as the primary measure of value of such a large bloc of Southern
Peru shares actually was consistent with the financial advisor's
reasoning. Moreover, from the recitation of the facts it also is not clear
whether, at the time of its preliminary presentation, the financial advisor
simply had not yet had the opportunity to perform detailed analyses of
the intrinsic value of Southern Peru and as a result whether the market
price comparison was primarily for illustrative purposes.32 In any event,
26. Id. at 71.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 71..
30. Id. at 75.
31. Id. at 71-72.
32. It is worth noting that the case came to trial almost seven years after the
announcement of the transaction and that, at that time, the lead banker for the special
2012] 963
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the preliminary presentation and market price of Southern Peru stock
would be central to the Chancellor's analysis.
Subsequent to its preliminary presentation, the financial advisor
performed detailed analyses regarding the value of Southern Peru as is
typical in most stock-for-stock transactions. For instance, a discounted
cash flow analysis was performed for Southern Peru using Southern Peru
management projections and a range of discount rates of 8% to 10%."
Based on the mid-range assumptions, this analysis implied an equity
value for Southern Peru of $2.06 billion, which was about $1.1 billion
less than the value implied by the trading price of Southern Peru shares
at the time.34 Other financial analyses performed were based on
"relative" valuations of the two companies. These included a "Relative
Discounted Cash Flow" analysis used to derive implied numbers of
Southern Peru shares to approximate the value of Minera, a "Multiple
Approach at Different EBITDA Scenarios" which the court described as
"essentially a comparison of Southern Peru and Minera's market-based
equity values as derived from multiples of Southern Peru's ...
estimated ... EBITDA," and a "Contribution Analysis at Different
EBITDA Scenarios" 35 to determine an implied number of Southern Peru
shares to be issued based on the relative contributions of Southern Peru
and Minera to the pro forma combined company.36
The court stated that the results of the financial analyses were
"basically telling the Special Committee. . . that Southern Peru was
being overvalued by the stock market," and that "even though Southern
Peru's stock was worth an obtainable amount in cash, it really was not
worth that much in fundamental terms." 3 7  The analyses apparently
"comforted" the special committee,38 but in the eyes of the court, "the
more logical reaction of someone not in the confined mindset of directors
of a controlled company may have been that it was a good time to
capitalize on the market multiple the company was getting and monetize
the asset."3 9 In other words, the court concluded that, despite Grupo
Mexico's controlling stake, the members of the special committee should
have considered a sale of Southern Peru or some other alternative
committee was not available to testify. Thus, as the court acknowledged, it did not have
a complete picture of the financial advisor's work or the reasoning behind its analyses.
Id. at 66 n.6.
33. Id. at 73.
34. Id.
35. "EBITDA" is an acronym for earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and
amortization.
36. In Re S. Peru at 81-82.
37. Id. at 73.
38. Id.
39. Id at 73.
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strategic transaction. The Chancellor noted that the special committee
instead "began to devalue the 'give"' of Southern Peru shares in order to
make the Minera "'get' look closer in value.AO
After some mostly ineffective back and forth with Grupo Mexico,
the special committee and the board of Southern Peru approved the
acquisition of Minera for shares of Southern Peru stock with a value of
approximately $3.1 billion based on the New York Stock Exchange
trading price at the time of the approval.4 1 The court found that the
transaction was not entirely fair to the minority shareholders and required
Grupo Mexico to pay Southern Peru a rather steep $1.263 billion in
damages, which the court determined constituted "a damage award that
approximates the difference between the price that the Special
Committee would have approved had the Merger been entirely fair (i.e.,
absent a breach of fiduciary duties) and the price that the Special
Committee actually agreed to pay.A2
In finding that the board breached its fiduciary duties, the court
focused on, among other things, the fact that the special committee
appeared to ignore Southern Peru's trading price in the course of the
negotiations with Grupo Mexico.4 3 It is well-accepted, as Chancellor
Strine acknowledged, that boards of directors and financial advisors
typically must look beyond market prices to determine fair value, and
certainly relative valuation analyses are commonly and validly used in
evaluating transactions in which equity securities are exchanged, such as
in a stock-for-stock merger. But In re Southern Peru warns that financial
advisors and boards must tread with caution when using valuation
techniques to go beyond market price if doing so may be construed as
contrary to the shareholders' interest. As Chancellor Strine explained:
[T]he Special Committee did not respond to its intuition that
Southern Peru was overvalued in a way consistent with its fiduciary
duties or the way that a third-party buyer would have. As noted, it
did not seek to have Grupo Mexico be the buyer. Nor did it say no to
Grupo Mexico's proposed deal. What it did was to turn the gold that
it held (market-tested Southern Peru stock worth in cash its trading
price) into silver (equating itself on a relative basis to a financially
strapped, non-market tested selling company), and thereby devalue its
own acquisition currency. Put bluntly, a reasonable third-party buyer
would only go behind the market if it thought the fundamental values
40. Id.
41. Id. at 65.
42. Id. at 116.
43. Id. at 104.
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were on its side, not retreat from a focus on market if such a move
disadvantaged it.44
It is important, however, to consider what In re Southern Peru does
not address. The case involved a conflicted board of directors and a
special committee that the court found was too deferential to the interests
of the controlling shareholder and was not vigorous in guarding the
shareholders' interests. The Chancellor was quite straightforward in this
regard: "[T]his Special Committee was in the altered state of a
controlled mindset. Instead of pushing Grupo Mexico into the range
suggested by [the financial advisor]'s analysis of Minera's fundamental
value, the Special Committee went backwards to accommodate Grupo
Mexico's asking price-an asking price that never really changed."45
This colored the Chancellor's entire approach and should be kept in mind
in considering the court's commentary on the financial analyses. In re
Southern Peru was not a situation where an independent board
determined to accept a price lower than market value for the benefit of
the shareholders. For instance, this was not a case of projected financial
difficulties not fully understood by the market, or of a board acting to
obtain synergies or opportunities not otherwise available. Although the
case counsels caution and extreme care when a financial advisor and its
client look beyond market price to accept a lower value particularly in
the entire fairness context, it does not stand for the proposition that such
a decision is never appropriate nor does it stand for the proposition that
market price is the only relevant measure of value.46
44. Id. at 105.
45. Id. at 102 (emphasis in original).
46. The Delaware courts have recognized that directors must be accorded a
significant degree of flexibility in obtaining the highest value reasonably available in a
sale of control and that, outside the entire fairness context, the courts will focus on the
board's process as opposed to the price at which a transaction is concluded. See, e.g.,
Wayne Cnty. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Corti, No. 3534-CC, 2009 WL 2219260, at *15-16
(Del. Ch. July 24, 2009). Transactions are occasionally concluded at a price below the
target's last trading price prior to announcement of the transaction because of financial or
operational difficulties or industry or economic conditions not fully reflected in the
market price. See, e.g., Brooklyn Federal Bancorp, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement
(Form 14A) at 22 (November 18, 2011); Cascade Financial Corporation, Definitive
Proxy Statement (Form 14A) at 28 (April 18, 2011); The Bear Stearns Companies Inc.,
Definitive Proxy Statement (Form 14A) at 37 (April 28, 2008); see also Matthew
Kamitschnig, IPC to Acquire Max Capital, WALL ST. J., March 2, 2009 at C3 (describing
IPC Holdings Ltd.'s acquisition of Max Capital Group, Ltd. for a price below Max
Capital's trading price as reflective of "the realities of the current environment"). In the
case of a healthy company, another reason a transaction may be effected at a price below
the company's last trading price prior to announcement is if the trading price has
increased as a result of speculation regarding a potential acquisition of the company. See,
e.g., Emergency Medical Services, Definitive Proxy Statement (Form 14A) at 23 (April
22, 2011); Compellent Technologies, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form 14A) at 22-
[Vol. 116:3966
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D. Be Prepared to Defend Those Comparables.
The Chancery Court judges tend to be extremely comfortable
relying on discounted cash flow analyses in entire fairness and appraisal
cases. As then Chancellor Chandler put it, "the DCF valuation has
featured prominently in this Court because it is the approach that merits
the greatest confidence within the financial community.'A7  Thus, all
things being equal, it is best to bring a discounted cash flow valuation to
the party so long as it is an otherwise appropriate analysis under the
circumstances.48
Alas, often the use of comparable companies and comparable
transactions analyses is necessary for a thorough study of value. A
banker using these analyses should expect judges and plaintiffs' lawyers
to take an extremely critical look, and in particular, the banker should be
prepared to explain why the comparables are in fact comparable (and
why outliers have been excluded, if that is the case). In one case,
Chancellor Chandler noted that the Delaware courts "have expressed
reservations when using the [comparables] approach and that 'the burden
of proof on the question whether the comparables are truly comparable
lies with the party making that assertion."" 9 He then went on to
disregard the comparables analyses because of differences in size,
products, and geographies in the comparable companies analysis and
because of differences in deal terms in the comparable transactions
analysis. In another case, a comparable companies analysis was
dismissed because the judge determined that it failed to take into account
important differences "including growth prospects, investment strategy,
and business mix."o5  The court also dismissed the comparable
transactions analysis on similar grounds, noting that the selection of
transactions "appeared arbitrary, in that [it] omitted certain transactions
23, 27-28 (January 14, 2011); see also Palash R. Ghosh, Dell's "Take-Under" of
Compellent Technologies, INT'L BUSINESS TIMES, Dec. 17, 2010,
http://m.ibtimes.com/dell-s-take-under-of-compellent-technologies-9341 0.html.
47. In re John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 758-CC, 2011 WL
227634, at *4 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 2011) (quoting Cede & Co. v JRC Acquisition Corp.,
No. 18648-NC, 2004 WL 286963, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 10, 2004)).
48. There are circumstances in which a discounted cash flow analysis is not useful.
For instance, the Delaware courts have recognized that a discounted cash flow analysis is
inappropriate in a circumstance in which reasonable projections of future cash flow are
not available. See Globis Partners, L.P. v. Plumtree Software, Inc., No. 1577-VCP, 2007
WL 4292024 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2007).
49. In re Sunbelt Beverage Corp. S'holder Litig., No. 16089-CC, 2010 WL 26539,
at *9 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2010) (quoting ONTI, Inc. v Integra Bank, 751 A.2d 904, 916
(Del. Ch. 1999)).
50. In re John Q. Hammons, 2011 WL 227634, at *5.
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with characteristics similar to those . .. ultimately selected.""1 Because
there always will be differences between the subject company and
transaction and the companies and transactions used as bases for
comparison, bankers must have a solid, explainable foundation for the
choice of companies and transactions included (and excluded) from the
analyses.
E. Be Prepared to Defend the Use or Failure to Use, as well as Any
Adjustments Made To, Management Projections.
Although, as a fairness opinion invariably says, the financial advisor
does not prepare the projections and relies on management's assurances
regarding their reasonableness, it is important for the financial advisor to
be able to articulate sound reasoning supporting its approach to
projections that are used (or ignored).
For instance, management projections should not be lightly
discarded. In S. Muoio & Co. v. Hallmark Entertainment, the Chancery
Court considered the recapitalization of a struggling company by its
controlling shareholder and primary debt holder.52 After bargaining with
a special committee of directors, the controlling shareholder agreed to
exchange the debt it held for additional shares of common stock, a new
issue of preferred stock, and a lower amount of debt with longer
maturities, which the court noted permitted the company to avoid default
and bankruptcy.53 Shareholders sued claiming the recapitalization
undervalued the company and resulted in an unjustified transfer of
wealth from the minority shareholders to the controlling shareholder.54
In support of its case, the plaintiffs presented the testimony of a valuation
expert who dismissed management's projections and instead used his
own set of significantly more optimistic projections. In the course of
finding for the controlling shareholder and the directors, the court
disregarded the testimony of plaintiffs' valuation expert in part because
of his failure to use management's projections.56 The court emphasized
that management's recent, reasonable, non-litigation biased projections,
if available, are the best foundation for valuation analyses, and any
departure from such projections must rest on solid reasoning.57
5 1. Id.
52. S. Muoio & Co. v. Hallmark Entm't Inv. Co., No. 4729-CC, 2011 WL 863007
(Del. Ch. Mar. 9, 2011).
53. Id. at *1.
54. Id.
55. Id. at * 17-19.
56. Id. at *19-20.
57. Id. But see In re Orchid Cellmark Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 6373-VCN, 2011 WL
1938253 (Del. Ch. May 12, 2011) (endorsing the refusal of an independent board and
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Accordingly, any dismissal of management's projections in favor of
other estimates should only follow careful consideration by the financial
advisor.
Of course, a banker should not rely blindly on projections just
because they were produced in the executive suite, and it may in fact be
appropriate to dismiss or adjust the projections. For instance, valuation
analyses have been disregarded by the Chancery Court if the underlying
management projections were not created in the ordinary course of
business and the evidence demonstrates that they were not based on
reasonable assumptions. If the projections are for the most part
acceptable, but adjustments are necessary, financial advisors should
expect that such adjustments will be closely scrutinized. For instance, in
In re Southern Peru, the court criticized the special committee for
adjustments made to Minera's projections that effectively "optimized"
Minera's cash flows.59 The court concluded that those adjustments were
unrealistic given Minera's historically poor performance and continuing
financial difficulties. 6 0 In addition, because similar adjustments were not
made with respect to estimates for Southern Peru, the court concluded
that the analyses that employed these estimates did not provide sound
bases for comparison of the relative values of the companies. 6 1 In any
event, although not responsible for the projections, it is advisable for a
financial advisor to do its due diligence to be comfortable that its
analyses rest on a supportable foundation. If adjustments are deemed
necessary, it is best for management or the board of directors to
determine the necessary adjustments. If that is not possible, the bank
should obtain the board's approval of any adjustments it has made and
describe such adjustments in its board presentation materials.
F. Beware the Company-Specific Risk Premium.
Applying a company-specific risk premium in a discounted cash
flow analysis to increase the applicable discount rate-and thereby
decrease the resulting implied valuation-can be hazardous. In In re
Sunbelt Beverage Corp. S'holder Litig., a minority shareholder
financial advisor to use more optimistic projections prepared by the CFO, and endorsed
by the CEO, of the subject company where the officers held options that were out of the
money at the deal price supported by the lower projections that were used).
58. In re John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 758-CC, 2011 WL
227634, at *4-5 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 2011). See also In re Orchid Cellmark, 2011 WL
1938253, at *6.
59. In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S'holder Derivative Litig., 30 A.3d 60, 102 (Del. Ch.
2011).
60. Id. at 103.
61. Id. at 102-04.
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challenged the price paid for her shares in a transaction orchestrated by
the majority holder as a breach of the board of director's fiduciary duties
62
and in the alternative sought appraisal of her shares. Balancing the
equities, the court determined that appraisal was the appropriate remedy
and turned to the various valuation analyses presented by the parties.6 3
The court relied on the discounted cash flow valuation analysis presented
by the plaintiff in part because it considered the company-specific risk
premium applied by the defendants inappropriate.
In this regard, Chancellor Chandler noted that although the
application of a small-firm risk premium often is warranted, 5 there is
"baseline skepticism" towards any company-specific risk premium. 66 He
explained that "to judges, the company-specific risk premium often
seems like the device experts employ to bring their final results in line
with their clients' objectives, when other valuation inputs fail to do the
trick."6 7 Accordingly, proponents bear the burden of proof in justifying
the use of such a premium based on company-specific facts. In Sunbelt,
the court rejected the defendants' proposed company-specific risk
premium in part because certain of the justifications advanced applied to
the industry as a whole, not solely to the subject company.68 The court
also rejected the argument that overly optimistic management projections
justified use of a company-specific risk premium. Chancellor Chandler
stated that he did not believe "a company should be able to manufacture
justification for a company-specific risk premium (and all the
quantitative uncertainty accompanied therewith) simply by adjusting its
management projections such that there is a heightened risk in relying on
those projections....
G. All Will Be Viewed in Context.
It seems obvious, but in light of the case law, it apparently bears
repeating-common sense should be applied. Although an analysis may
be theoretically sound, bankers must be mindful of context. Valuation
analyses will be subject to review in light of the economic realities facing
the company and the results of other valuation methods used. For
62. In re Sunbelt Beverage Corp. S'holder Litig., No. 16089-CC, 2010 WL 26539, at
*1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2010).
63. Id. at *6.
64. Id. at *13.
65. Id.at*ll.
66. Id. at *12.
67. Id (quoting Delaware Open MRI Radiology Assoc., P.A. v. Kessler, 898 A.3d
290, 339 (Del. Ch. 2006)).





instance, in In re John Q. Hammons, the court dismissed a high valuation
because it was clearly at odds with the fact that the company was
teetering on the edge of bankruptcy and that an auction had not produced
any interest from potential bidders that supported the valuation
analysis.n Similarly, in In re Southern Peru, the court criticized the
special committee's application of Southern Peru's EBITDA multiples to
Minera because Southern Peru was a healthy, publicly traded company
while Minera was a private company beset with financial and operational
difficulties.72 The court also noted that such multiples were contrary to
the conditions prevailing in the industry.73
If a banker plans to rely on one valuation analysis that has yielded
results significantly different than those produced by other analyses, it
should be prepared to defend that choice against vigorous scrutiny.
Similarly, if a banker plans to rely primarily on one valuation analysis, it
is ideal to conduct other analyses or provide other data, such as historical
trading data, that support the primary analysis if at all possible. For
instance, in rejecting plaintiffs' claims in S. Muoio that the
recapitalization led by the controlling shareholder and primary debt
holder was unfair to the minority shareholders, Chancellor Chandler
noted:
In this case, [plaintiffs' expert's] single methodology valuation of
[the company] is roughly three times higher than any of the other
valuations. The more robust approaches taken by defendants' experts
and advisors, however, used multiple valuation methodologies and
independently reached results that fell within the same range.
Although there certainly may be circumstances where using only one
valuation methodology is appropriate and reliable, this is not such a
circumstance.74
Of course, as Chancellor Chandler has acknowledged in S. Muoio
and other cases, sometimes only a single type of analysis is useful, and in
such instances, the banker should be prepared to explain why in
significant detail.75
71. See In re John Q. Hammons Hotels Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 758-CC, 2011 WL
227634, at *5, *13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 14, 2011).
72. In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S'holder Derivative Litig., 30 A.3d 60, 104 (Del. Ch.
2011).
73. Id.atl1O-11.
74. S. Muoio & Co. v. Hallmark Entm't, No. 4729-CC, 2011 WL 863007, at *17
(Del. Ch. Mar. 9, 2011).
75. In re John Q. Hammons, 2011 WL 227634, at *4-5.
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III. NUMBERS IN PROSE: DISCLOSURE CASES
A. The Good News Is that Disclosure Cases Turn on the Description of
the Financial Advisor's Analyses in the Disclosure Document Sent
to the Shareholders, Not on the Substance of the Work.
The Delaware courts have been clear that shareholder plaintiffs
cannot attack the substance of a financial advisor's analysis in the guise
of a disclosure claim. Plaintiffs often attempt to use this tactic because a
disclosure claim generally is easier to establish than a claim based on the
substance of the advisor's work, which would require a showing that the
analysis contributed to a breach of fiduciary duty by the board.
The only relevant issue in a disclosure claim is whether the methods
used by the bank are accurately described in all material respects so that,
if a shareholder disagrees with the approach, he or she can vote against
the transaction and exercise appraisal rights. For instance, shareholder
plaintiffs brought suit challenging Hewlett Packard Company's
acquisition of 3Com Corporation arguing in part that the proxy submitted
to the 3Com shareholders in connection with the shareholder vote on the
acquisition "fail[ed] to disclose why [3Com's financial advisor] deviated
from accepted practices in its valuation methodology."76 Among other
things, the plaintiffs focused on the financial advisor's treatment of
stock-based compensation as a cash expense in its discounted cash flow
analysis. The court rejected this claim:
Under Delaware law, the valuation work performed by an investment
banker must be accurately described and appropriately qualified. So
long as that is done, there is no need to disclose any discrepancy
between the financial advisor's methodology and the Delaware fair
value standard under Section 262 (or any other standard for that
matter). If shareholders believe the financial advisor undervalued the
company after reading a summary of its work, they are free to
exercise their appraisal rights under Section 262. Indeed, an
appraisal action addresses this concern by subjecting the financial
advisor's fairness opinion to scrutiny. Valuing a company as a going
concern is a subjective and uncertain enterprise. There are limitless
opportunities for disagreement on the appropriate valuation
methodologies to employ, as well as the appropriate inputs to deploy
within those methodologies. Considering this reality, quibbles with a
76. In re 3com Shareholders Litigation, No. 5067-CC, 2009 WL 5173804, at *2
(Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2009).
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financial advisor's work simply cannot be the basis of a disclosure
claim.7
B. The Bad News Is That, If the Disclosure Regarding the Financial
Advisor's Analyses is Misleading or Inadequate, the Transaction
May Be Enjoined.
Given the importance of the financial advisor's work to the board of
directors and shareholder decision making processes,7 8 an error in the
description of the analyses in a disclosure document may be deemed
material and result in an injunction of the shareholder vote while
corrective disclosures are made so that the shareholders have all material
information relating to their decision. 7 9  Accordingly, counsel should
work closely with the financial advisor to make sure the description
accurately reflects all the material aspects of the financial advisor's
analyses and presentation.80
The recent Maric Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. PLATO Learning,
Inc.81 case illustrates some of the hazards that arise in this process.
There, shareholders moved to enjoin the acquisition of PLATO Learning,
Inc. by Thoma Bravo, LLC as a result of inadequate disclosure.82 In its
description of the analyses performed by the financial advisor to the
PLATO Learning board of directors, the proxy statement noted that the
range of discount rates used by the target's financial advisor in its
discounted cash flow analysis was based on "an analysis" of the target's
weighted average cost of capital (or WACC).8 3 However, the actual
WACC analysis performed by the advisor yielded results that were lower
77. Id. at *6 (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Globis Partners, L.P. v.
Plumtree Software, Inc., No. 1577-VCP, 2007 WL 4292024, at *11 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30
2007).
78. See Simonetti Rollover IRA v. Margolis, No. 3694-VCN, 2008 WL 5048692, at
*8 (Del. Ch. June 27, 2008) ("The financial advisor's opinion of financial fairness for a
proposed transaction is one of the most important process-based underpinnings of a
board's recommendation of a transaction to its stockholders and, in turn, for the
stockholders' decisions on the appropriateness of the transaction.").
79. Such a delay may put a transaction in jeopardy as events may occur (e.g., a
significant disruption to the business that constitutes a "Material Adverse Effect" as
defined in the transaction agreement) that result in a failure of one of the conditions to the
transaction to be satisfied.
80. In practice, counsel to the financial advisor typically is charged in the first
instance with summarizing the financial advisor's presentation to the target's board of
directors for inclusion in the disclosure document submitted to shareholders in
connection with a transaction. Ultimate responsibility for such disclosure, however, rests
with the subject company, and its counsel typically reviews such disclosure closely.
81. Maric Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. PLATO Learning, Inc., 11 A.3d 1175 (Del.
Ch. 2010).
82. Id. at 1175-76.
83. Id. at 1176.
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than the bottom end of the range of discount rates used in the
presentation materials submitted to the board of directors and disclosed
in the proxy statement. 84 In other words, a higher discount rate was used
in the discounted cash flow analysis and accordingly, the implied value
of PLATO Learning was lower than it otherwise would have been had
the advisor used the actual WACC range it had calculated.85 Neither the
board book nor the proxy explained the difference between the results of
the actual WACC "analysis" and the range of discount rates used.86 The
court concluded this was a material error that justified enjoining the vote
on the transaction until corrective disclosures were made. To avoid
such a fate (and the concomitant embarrassment), the description of the
financial advisor's analysis must accurately reflect the work done by the
financial advisor, including those subtleties that may prove material to a
shareholder. In addition, any deviation from actual calculations should
have a reasonable basis, and if material, should be explained in both the
board book and the shareholder disclosure document.8 9
C. A Financial Advisor Should Assume that Any Company Projections
Used in its Analyses Will Be Disclosed to Shareholders.
The Delaware case law regarding disclosure of projections to
shareholders is somewhat muddled.90 In general, however, a financial
advisor should expect that a summary of any projections received from
the target and used by the financial advisor in its analyses will be
disclosed. In particular, the Chancery Court recently clarified that if the
financial advisor relies on a discounted cash flow analysis, any free cash
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. Id. at 1176-77.
87. Id. at 1176.
88. See id. at 1177-78.
89. See id.
90. Compare In re Netsmart Techs., Inc. S'holders Litig., 924 A.2d 171, 203 (Del.
Ch. 2007) (requiring disclosure in merger proxy statement of adjusted management
projections used in financial advisor's analysis), with In re Checkfree Corp. S'holders
Litig., No. 3193-CC, 2007 WL 3262188, at *3 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2007) (holding that
disclosure of management projections not required if proxy statement otherwise includes
a fair summary of the substantive work performed by the financial advisor). For another
helpful analysis, see Jacob M. Mattinson, Comment, Disclosure of Free Cash Flow
Projections in a Merger or Tender Offer, 116 PENN ST. L. REv. 577 (2011) (comparing
Delaware case law on disclosure of projections used by financial advisor and proposing




flow projections provided to the financial advisor by the company must
be disclosed.91
Ideally, there will be one set of target projections that are prepared
by management in a pre-transaction, unbiased context and are then used
for all purposes in the transaction as opposed to having multiple, and
perhaps contradictory, sets of projections that may turn up in the course
of litigation. It is, of course, preferable that the projections process be
managed to that end; however, the role of the financial advisor is limited
in this regard. Projections are management's responsibility, and
although the financial advisor can review projections and provide advice
to management, the preparation and substance of the projections is
ultimately the decision of the company. If there are multiple sets of
projections, the financial advisor should have a sound basis for why it
relied on one set and not the other. In addition, if in the course of its
analysis the financial advisor makes adjustments or assumptions that
result in differences between the projections used in its analysis and
those included in the disclosure document distributed to shareholders, the
financial advisor should consider describing such adjustments and the
reasoning behind them in its materials for the board and in the
description of its analyses disseminated to shareholders.
D. Should Disclosure Be Managed in Anticipation ofLitigation and
Potential Settlement?
Many lawsuits challenging transactions are settled by agreeing to
modifications in the disclosure document distributed to shareholders
without the payment of money damages. Given the prevalence of
transaction-related litigation and the importance of the financial advisor's
analyses in many such suits, one question that arises when preparing the
shareholder disclosure document is whether disclosure regarding the
financial advisor's analyses should be managed in the expectation that
additions may be used to settle an expected lawsuit. This is a path
fraught with risk, and the Chancery Court judges are aware that there is
significant temptation to travel down it. Recently, Vice Chancellor
Laster has noted that judges will cast an extremely wary eye on
disclosure documents that omit disclosure that the Delaware case law
91. See Maric Capital, 11 A.3d at 1176. But see Steamfitters Local Union 447 v.
Walter, No. 5492-CC, slip op. at 8-10 (Del. Ch. June 21, 2010) (holding that disclosure of
projections actually provided to, and used by, financial advisor is sufficient; no disclosure
of free cash flow estimates required where none were actually provided to financial
advisor).
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clearly requires. 9 2 Banks and transaction parties thus are well advised to
tread carefully when considering this issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
Counsel to the financial advisor as well as counsel to the principals
in a merger and acquisition transaction should heed the admonitions of
these recent cases. Care and consistency in preparing valuation analyses,
and in describing them adequately to shareholders, are essential to the
smooth effectuation of transactions. The lessons thus learned can avoid
costly challenges to the price paid in a transaction, injunctions delaying
the consummation of the transaction (and exposing the transaction to
continued deal risk in the interim) and the embarrassment of a published
opinion from a sophisticated judge who is critical of the methodologies
employed and who speculates as to the motivations underlying the
challenged conduct.
92. See Transcript of Ruling of the Court on Defendants' Motion to Proceed in One
Jurisdiction and Dismiss or Stay Litigation in Other Jurisdictions at 12-13, Kahn v. Chell
(Del. Ch. June 7, 2011) (No. 6511-VCL).
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